

NASEO Energy Security Committee Cyber and Physical Security Strategy Session: Protecting Against Manmade Threats


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ICF proprietary and confidential





02/08/2023



8,000+

Employees 75 global / 45 U.S. locations Reston, VA HQ

2,000+

Energy and grants management Professionals

50+

years of energy work State energy security plan support for 7 states

Climate and clean energy plans in 10 states

Services include:

- •
- •





Energy assurance planning

 Stakeholder engagement/ outreach

Climate action and clean energy planning

GHG inventories and energy assessments


Economic, health, and equity analysis

Energy and GHG modeling

Climate risk assessments



ICF's approach to developing state energy security plans




ldentify operational gaps

Identify mitigation opportunities

Update plan continually with stakeholder input

Stakeholders



 Natural Gas Utilities Petroleum Terminals **Pipeline Operators**

> Governor's Office, especially if there is a Cybersecurity point of State fusion center

Stakeholder questions

Threats/Hazards

- What are the key threats and hazards impacting energy systems in the state?
- Are there any specific infrastructure that are uniquely vulnerable in the state?
- Are any regions or communities of the state that are uniquely vulnerable?
- Understand timelines for repair and replacement activities. (Crew shortage, transformer supply issues, etc.)
- Understanding energy asset • ability to continue operations if OT/IT offline?

Communication/ Coordination

- Discuss your emergency response plan. Are different stakeholders engaged if it is a cyber or physical event?
- Do you participate in regional planning or response? (Other states, utility mutual aid)
- What formal event reporting requirements, if any, are you subject to at the state level?

Response

- request from other stakeholders?
- waivers, RVP, etc.)

Mitigation

• What resources do you have available to deploy during events? What resources can you

• What regulatory waivers can you grant (or request)? (HOS

• What mitigation activities do you have underway (or identified as next steps) for critical energy infrastructure?

Cyber and physical impacts come in many forms

FBI Thwarts Targeted Plot To Attack Maryland's Electrical **Substations**

FBI investigating damage to substation for Keystone Pipeline

Four substations attacked in Washington state, leaving thousands without power

U.S. regulator releases report blaming Freeport LNG blast on inadequate processes

Hackers stole data from multiple electric utilities in recent ransomware attack

> **Hackers Breached Colonial Pipeline Using Compromised Password**

North Carolina last days after shooting attacks on substations


Car hits pole, takes down power lines during early morning crash in Northeast Philadelphia

Enbridge briefly shut Line 5 after protesters tampered with pipeline

power outages could

Cybersecurity threats and impact

Exhibit 7: Examples of Cyber Threats to the Liquid Fuel Supply Chain





 A **cyberattack** resulting in widespread power outages could disrupt operations for refineries, pipelines, terminals and end users. For example, a power outage at a refinery that disrupts cooling water or steam generation could damage equipment, shut down processes and create unsafe conditions. Manipulation of power plant sensors or other generation infrastructure could damage equipment and cause a power plant to go offline.

A **ransomware** or other IT attack on company headquarters or data servers could limit ability to access and/or keep private company data, complete financial transactions, access internal company software or maintain a public-facing website. Attacks on IT infrastructure may result in the company proactively shutting down physical infrastructure.




Maryland liquid fuel plan

Risk assessment



- Likelihood of event • occurring
- Location •



Mitigation options to consider and/or fund

State

- Requiring utilities to submit cyber resilience plans to the PSC or PUC (E.g., Maryland)
- Increasing penalties for physical attacks \bullet on energy infrastructure: North Carolina, South Carolina, Arizona
- Conducting cyber and physical exercises \bullet
- Sharing best practices

Industry

- Increasing redundancy of electricity • systems
- Coordinating with other utilities for • mutual assistance and agreements to share transformers, etc., if needed
- Contracting private companies to • increase cyber security/evaluate cyber resilience
- Collaborating with other utilities on • cyber resilience and sharing best practices
- Applying for grants for mitigation • funding
- **Conducting exercises** ٠
- Upgrading security operations centers ٠
- Hardening transmission infrastructure, ٠ including perimeter fencing, electronic monitoring equipment, and improved access control
- Testing new equipment to assess • potential and cost-to-benefit tradeoff

- Funding opportunities
- CIPs for cybersecurity)
- on threats


Federal

Establishing standards and regulatory requirement (TSA cybersecurity requirements for pipelines; NERC CIP-014 for physical security and multiple

Facilitating information sharing between private sector and/or states

Assisting with threat assessment

Summary: SEO's Role in Energy Sector Cyber and Physical Security




Questions?

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About ICF

ICF (NASDAQ:ICFI) is a global consulting and digital services company with over 8,000 full- and part-time employees, but we are not your typical consultants. At ICF, business analysts and policy specialists work together with digital strategists, data scientists and creatives. We combine unmatched industry expertise with cutting-edge engagement capabilities to help organizations solve their most complex challenges. Since 1969, public and private sector clients have worked with ICF to navigate change and shape the future.